In State v. Michael Owens (A-54/55-24/089721) (Decided January 6, 2026), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder. While the Court’s decision largely adopted the dissent to the Appellate Division’s decision, the justices also offered additional guidance on when the instruction is warranted.
Facts of State v. Owens
Defendant Michael Owens (Owens or Defendant) was convicted by a jury of murder, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and aggravated assault. As set forth in court documents, upon learning that another man had telephoned his girlfriend, Owens choked her, seized her cell phone, and departed. About 45 minutes later, Owens shot and killed Gonzalez, from whom his girlfriend regularly bought heroin, after finding his contact information in the cell phone.
Defendant appealed, arguing, as relevant here, that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder and in failing to sever the aggravated assault charge from the offenses related to the homicide. Owens also challenged his sentence.
The majority of the Appellate Division panel agreed that “the trial court was obligated to sua sponte instruct the jury on [the] lesser-included offense” of passion/provocation manslaughter. According to the majority, “an unrequested charge on a lesser-included offense must be given only where the facts in evidence clearly indicate the appropriateness of that charge,” and that “the need for the charge must jump off the proverbial page.”
The majority also stated that “[i]n determining whether to instruct a jury on passion/provocation manslaughter, the trial judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant.” As to severance, the majority concluded that “it was a clear error in judgment for the trial court not to sanitize the State’s proofs regarding the aggravated assault charge.” The majority vacated Owen’s convictions of murder and possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. The majority therefore did not reach his sentencing challenge.
Judge Gilson dissented, expressing the view that no passion/provocation manslaughter charge was required because “Gonzalez did not provoke defendant”; defendant “had ample time to cool off before he shot Gonzalez”; there was no plain error in the jury instruction; and there were no “clear grounds for vacating defendant’s murder conviction” and overturning the jury’s verdict.
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion “that the trial court erred in not sanitizing the aggravated assault evidence and that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its apparent prejudice.”
Judge Gilson did not “deem evidence that defendant choked his girlfriend to be unduly prejudicial given that defendant was charged with aggravated assault of his girlfriend”; he also “discern[ed] no abuse of discretion in admitting that evidence to be considered in relation to the separate, but related, murder charge.” Judge Gilson “would affirm defendant’s convictions” on the offenses at issue here.
The State appealed as of right on the basis of the dissent, and the Court granted Owen’s petition for certification.
NJ Supreme Court Decision in State v. Owens
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed. The Defendant’s convictions for murder and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose were reinstated and the matter was remanded to the Appellate Division for consideration of his sentencing challenge.
In reaching its decision, the Court adopted the reasoning set forth in Judge Gilson’s dissent.
“We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate Division substantially for the reasons stated in Judge Gilson’s thoughtful dissenting opinion,” the unanimous Court wrote in a short per curium opinion.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also addressed the standard for whether to instruct on passion/provocation manslaughter. The justices advised that if a defendant does not request that the jury be charged on a lesser-included offense at trial, or, as in this case, explicitly states that no lesser-included offenses should be charged, an appellate court reviews only whether the evidence in the record clearly indicates that the charge was nonetheless required, that is, if the evidence supporting the charge is jumping off the page.
The most-favorable-to-the-defendant standard is reserved for cases where a defendant affirmatively requests a trial court to instruct on passion/provocation manslaughter. It does not apply when, as in this case, the issue is raised as plain error.
