The basics:
- Private equity-backed MSOs are partnering with a growing number of plaintiffs’ law firms
- Ethics rules generally prohibit lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers
- Fixed management fees may raise questions if they effectively track law firm revenue
- Author calls for greater transparency into MSO agreements, fees and valuations
Private equity is moving into the legal business, and we are starting to learn some very large numbers.
Earlier this year, the Financial Times reported that Fortress Investment Group invested $125 million in Rafi Law Services, a management services organization connected to Arizona personal injury firm Rafi Law Group. The transaction reportedly valued the business at roughly $450 million. Rafi Law Group itself remains owned by attorney Brandon Rafi. Fortress invested in the MSO, not the law firm.
Other transactions are coming quickly. Orion Legal MSO, which is owned by private equity firm Uplift Investors, has now partnered with a growing list of plaintiffs’ firms, including Dudley DeBosier Injury Lawyers, Hughes & Coleman Injury Lawyers, John Foy & Associates and, most recently, Rainwater, Holt & Sexton.
In announcing the Rainwater transaction in September, Orion, through counsel, said it would provide marketing, finance, technology, talent and administrative infrastructure while the law firm would remain 100% owned by its lawyers and continue directing the legal practice.
We know who the players are. We know these arrangements involve significant money. We know sophisticated private equity investors believe there is enormous value in the business infrastructure surrounding successful law firms.
What we generally do not know is how the money actually moves after the closing.
That matters.
Abiding by the rule
Lawyers in New Jersey and most other states operate under a very old and very important rule: legal fees generally cannot be shared with nonlawyers. The reason is not that lawyers deserve some special economic privilege. The rule exists largely to protect professional independence. The person advising a client should not have an outside investor standing behind the lawyer with a financial interest capable of influencing legal judgment.
The emerging MSO model is designed to operate around that dividing line without crossing it.
Instead of investing directly in the law firm, outside investors put their money into a separate management services organization. The MSO may own or provide the nonlegal infrastructure of the practice: marketing, technology, office operations, administrative employees, human resources, finance and other business functions. The lawyers continue to own the actual law firm.
At closing, there can be a very substantial payment for those nonlegal assets and interests. The lawyer who spent decades building a practice can therefore receive significant money upfront without, at least in form, selling a percentage of future legal fees to private equity.
There is nothing automatically improper about selling valuable business assets. But after the celebration dinner comes the question I find much more interesting.
How does the MSO get paid?
The law firm still earns the legal fees. The MSO now owns or operates much of the machinery required to produce them. So the law firm enters into a management services agreement and pays the MSO for the services it provides.
That recurring payment stream is enormously important because it helps explain why investors are willing to place such substantial valuations on these businesses.
What’s the problem?
Here is where the ethics rules become fascinating. One obvious way to compensate a management company would be to give it a percentage of law firm revenue. If the firm earns $100 million, perhaps the MSO receives 20%. If the firm earns $150 million, the MSO receives $30 million. Simple.
There is also a serious problem with it.
In 2025, the Texas Commission on Professional Ethics considered almost exactly that arrangement. A nonlawyer-owned company wanted to provide support services to law firms and charge periodic fees calculated as a percentage of the lawyer’s or firm’s revenue. The committee concluded that the arrangement amounted to impermissible fee sharing. Importantly, it did not matter that the fee was tied to overall firm revenue rather than an identified client’s recovery. The opinion says a lawyer may not pay a nonlawyer-owned vendor based upon a percentage of the lawyer’s or firm’s revenues.
Attorneys actively structuring MSO transactions have publicly acknowledged the same boundary. Holland & Knight, which has become deeply involved in these deals, has explained that management fees generally cannot be percentages of law firm revenue. Instead, the fee may be structured as a flat monthly payment, a cost-plus arrangement or another mechanism that is not directly tied to firm revenue or the profits from particular cases. One of its attorneys has stated even more specifically that the fee should be fixed and reflect fair market value.
The multimillion-dollar question
Now we arrive at the question I cannot stop thinking about.
If the MSO cannot simply receive 20% of the law firm’s revenue, how do you economically support a $450 million valuation?
There may be perfectly satisfactory answers. Suppose a large law firm historically spends $50 million every year on advertising, technology, accounting, staff, facilities and other business operations. An MSO takes over those responsibilities and charges the law firm a commercially reasonable amount for providing them. The MSO earns a margin. Investors value that recurring stream of income. Nothing about that concept is particularly exotic.
But lawyers should want to know where the boundaries are. Assume the law firm’s underlying operating costs are $50 million. Could an MSO charge $55 million? Perhaps. What about $65 million? Seventy-five million? At what point does the payment cease looking like fair-market compensation for legitimate services and begin looking economically like a mechanism for transferring the profits of a law practice to nonlawyer investors?
The answer cannot simply be, “It is a fixed fee.” A percentage sign is not the only way to make one number track another.
Imagine this …
Imagine a firm projected to generate $100 million annually. The parties could theoretically agree to a $25 million fixed management fee. On paper, nobody receives 25% of revenue. The contract says $25 million.
But if that number was chosen precisely because it represents approximately 25% of expected legal revenue, have we really changed the economics, or only the drafting?
I am not suggesting that any of the publicly announced MSO transactions are structured that way. We do not know.
And that is precisely the point.
The headline deals are being announced publicly. We are told which firms are partnering with which MSOs. We are told who owns the management company. Sometimes we learn the investment amount or valuation. We are told, appropriately, that the lawyers will retain control of legal judgment.
What we generally do not get to see is the actual management services agreement. We don’t see the fee. We don’t see the formula. We don’t see the valuation analysis establishing fair market value.
What we generally do not get to see is the actual management services agreement. We don’t see the fee. We don’t see the formula.
We don’t see how often the management payment can be adjusted, what causes it to increase, how long the agreement lasts, or what happens if the law firm decides the arrangement no longer serves its interests.
Why the agreements matter
Some industry guidance makes clear just how consequential those provisions are. Lawyers advising MSO investors have noted that lenders examine the term, renewal, termination and assignment provisions of the management agreement, the methodology used to calculate the management fee and whether it reflects fair market value. They also advise structuring these agreements with long terms, automatic renewals and strong termination protections because the durability of the law firm’s payments is central to the MSO’s financing value.
That is not a criticism. It is how sophisticated transactions work. It is also why the agreements matter.
The legal profession is being asked, in effect, to accept an important proposition: that outside investors can acquire enormously valuable economic interests surrounding law practices while the lawyers remain independent and no legal fees are shared. Maybe they can.
But when hundreds of millions of dollars are changing hands, “trust us, the lawyers still own the law firm” is not the end of the analysis. It is the beginning.
A call for transparency
I would like to see more transparency around these arrangements, particularly as they become larger and more common. Not the disclosure of proprietary business information for its own sake, and certainly not confidential client information. But the profession should develop a much clearer understanding of how management fees are established, how fair market value is determined, how frequently those fees change, and what safeguards prevent a management payment from becoming fee sharing by another name.
There is another reason for that transparency. Private equity investors are very good at understanding economics. They know exactly what they are buying. They understand recurring revenue, margins, cash flow, valuation multiples and contractual protections.
Lawyers should understand them just as well. Because if an investor is willing to pay $100 million, $200 million or eventually perhaps $1 billion for the business wrapped around a law firm, there is an obvious question every lawyer should ask.
What exactly is worth that much money?
The answer is probably not the desks, the computers or the HR department. It is the future cash flow. And until we can see more clearly how that cash gets from the lawyer-owned firm to the investor-owned MSO, this rapidly growing corner of the legal business will remain unnecessarily shrouded in secrecy.
That does not mean something improper is happening behind the curtain. But when the future of lawyer independence may depend on what is written there, I think lawyers have every reason to ask that somebody open it.
Michael J. Epstein, a Harvard Law School graduate, is a trial lawyer and managing partner of The Epstein Law Firm PA, with offices in Rochelle Park, Englewood Cliffs and Montclair.
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